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Abstract: This paper reexamines the capital accumulation within a neo-classical 
growth model under the assumption of hyperbolic discounting as well as endogenous 
preference, finding that 1) two kinds of Naifs’ behavior coincides under log utility; 2) 
increasing marginal impatience due to capital accumulation itself will negatively 
affect the steady state locus of consumption and capital; 3) the effect of hyperbolic 
settings through effective rate of preference is still ambiguous; 4) we prove the 
saddle-point  equilibrium  property for the steady state under various assumptions 
about individual’s preference. Our model also  justifies Max Weber's idea that 
although spirit of capitalism is an engine to capital accumulation, the subsequent 
growing wealth will damage this engine. 
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1. Introduction 
The neoclassical theory of optimal growth assumes that people have stationary 
time preferences in that they discount the future with a constant exponential rate. 
However, recent studies (Ainslie [1992]) suggest that people are highly impatient 
about consuming between today and tomorrow but are much more patient about 
choices advanced further in the future. Motivated by such findings, Laibson have   2 
done a series of works examining intertemporal choices of hyperbolic consumers 
(Laibson [1994], [1996], [1997], [1998]). 
The main problem associated with hyperbolic individuals is the fundamental 
asymmetry between the present and future selves, which is called the 
time-inconsistent problem. Individuals are assumed to be composed of conflicting 
selves --- current self and future selves. Each self is tied to choices of all other selves. 
At an equilibrium, each self choose optimal strategies given the strategies of all other 
selves. 
Barro [1999] incorporates hyperbolic discounting into the standard Ramsey 
model, with an re-examination of individual choices under different commitment 
assumptions. He proves that in the case of no commitment and log utility, the 
equilibrium features a constant effective rate of time preference and is observationally 
equivalent to the standard Ramsey model. First he guesses the solution with an 
undetermined parameter, and then solves the parameter under an intra-personal Nash 
equilibrium. Note that the first-best choice, characterized by the conventional 
Hamiltonian system, is never a stable one, since future selves will intrinsically not 
obey the plans made by current self; instead, all future selves have a tendency to 
deviate from what previous self has planned because they have better choices under 
their own beliefs. In the sense of such facts, the only stationary choice (or enforceable 
consumption plan) is given by an intra-personal Nash equilibrium as in Barro [1999]. 
The method he uses will be summarized in Section 2, which we will use throughout 
this paper. 
Another problem related to hyperbolic representatives is the uniqueness of the 
Nash equilibrium, to which Barro [1999] refers as a footnote after he works out the 
time-consistent solution. Laibson [1996] has proved the uniqueness of the solution in 
a discrete-time model, given that the utility function is concave, not just for log utility. 
In Barro’s analysis, however, the long-run discount rate was assumed to a strictly 
positive constant, and thus could not explain why different countries have various 
preference structures. For example, empirical studies imply that people in wealthy 
countries tend to have a higher discount rate than those in poor countries, and wealthy   3 
people are more impatient than poor people. Motivated by such evidence, we assume 
that the long-run discount rate is endogenously determined by capital. Raising the 
level of real assets increases the rate of time preference and future consumption. This 
does not contradict the accepted intuition that savings are a decreasing function of 
financial wealth as described by the Mundell-Tobin effect. Epstein and Hynes [1983] 
first offered the intuition for using wealth effects to transform time preference into an 
endogenous function, but it received only a footnote. They argue that monetary 
growth raises the opportunity cost of holding real balances, which shifts a positively 
sloped rate of time preference function down along a negatively sloped marginal 
product of capital locus. This reduces the real interest rate and increases steady state 
capital according to the Mundell-Tobin effect. 
In our model, we characterize two kinds of tendencies as time forwards: first 
although the impatience increases as time interval expands, the marginal impatience 
decreases; on the other hand, the marginal impatience increases over time as a result 
of capital accumulation --- so called increasing marginal impatience. Our theory of 
increasing marginal impatience originates from Max Weber’s perception in his The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Although capitalism is one engine for 
capital accumulation, since people with capitalism continually accumulate wealth for 
its own sake, rather than for the material rewards that it can serve to bring, Weber 
further points out that as the wealth level increases, people intrinsically tend to have 
less religion and thus less self-control of his current behavior in terms of the increased 
desire along with declined ability to resist the temptation. To sum up, wealth 
accumulation impairs its own engine. Before closing his book, Weber cites John 
Wesley (the founder of the Methodist Church)’s words to further this idea: 
"I fear, wherever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in 
the same proportion…For religion must necessarily produce both industry and 
frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase, so will pride, 
anger, and love of the world in all its branches…For the Methodists in every place 
grow diligent and frugal; consequently they increase in goods. Hence they 
proportionately increase in pride, in anger, in the desire of the flesh, the desire of the   4 
eyes, and the pride of life. So, although the form of religion remains, the spirit is 
swiftly vanishing away…" (John Wesley in Weber, 175). 
In our settings people become less patient toward future consumption as wealth 
accumulates. In addition, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is positively 
related to capital accumulation. In this paper, we do not discuss the effect of 
capitalism, but concentrate on the pure wealth effect towards person’s impatience, 
which is characterized by our partly marginal increasing impatience model. Further, in 
sense of Rabin, et al [1999], we suppose people are either naïve or sophisticated about 
two things: future self-control problems caused by time-inconsistent 
preference ) ( τ φ − t   as in Barro [1999], and captital-related discount factor denoted by 
) ( t k ρ , with 0 ) ( ≥ ⋅ ′ ρ
1. 
   The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section, section 2, describes the 
basic model. Section 3 employs dynamic analysis and characterizes the steady state 
under various assumptions. We close in section 4 with concluding remarks and some 
suggestions for future work. A brief mathematical appendix is also included. 
 
2. The Model 
2.1 Basic model with endogenous time preference 
We consider a perfectly competitive decentralized economy where the 
households maximize the discounted value of their dynastic utility over infinite 
horizon. The households are identical in tastes and preferences as well as in terms of 
initial endowments. A single commodity is produced using two factors of production 
---  capital and labor, and at every point of time, there is full employment of both 
factors. The final commodity can be used as consumption good as well as investment 
good in the form of capital. Assume the population is constant, which is normalized to 
unit throughout this paper. If we assume the instantaneous rate of discounting is given 
                                                   
1  Here  ρ   denotes instantaneous rate of discounting, and thus  0 ≥ ′ ρ   means increasing marginal impatience.   5 
by  ) ( t k ρ   with  0 ) ( ≥ ⋅ ′ ρ , and the two kind of individual preferences ---  naifs and 
sophisticates --- will take the forms of (N1) and (S1) respectively. 
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Remark: naifs could not predict his evolution of time preference, and thus would 
believe the current time-preference will persist, which is represented by the factor 
) ( τ ρ k   rather than what sophisticates predict as  ) ( t k ρ   for time t’s instantaneous rate 
of discounting. Assume individual’s income is exogenously determined by the wage 
rate and interest payment from renting capital, that is,  ) ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ( t w t k t r t k f + = . Then 
the budget constraint would be,  c t w t k t r k − + = ) ( ) ( ) (  . 
 
2.1.1 Naifs’ choice   
Naifs have no demand for any commitment device since they always think they 
can commit future choice regardless of how the past choice goes. Selfτ   chooses 
consumption flow  } ), ( { τ
τ ≥ t t c   according to his current belief toward his lifetime 
utility function, whereas he could only enforce 
τ
τ c . In the eyes of Selfτ , his choice 
would be time-consistent since his time preference is characterized by the constant 
) ( τ ρ k . The first order conditions are given by, 
t c t c u λ
τ = ) ( , 
                             )] ( ) ( [ / τ ρ λ λ k k f t t t − ′ − =  ,                 (1) 
where  t λ   is the co-state variable associated with the capital stock  t k .   6 
And thus,  )] ( ) ( [ / τ
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The first equation in (1) means that, along an optimal program, naifs perceive 
that the marginal utility of consumption should be equal to the shadow price of the 
capital stock; the second equation defines what naifs think as the rate of change in the 
marginal value of the capital stock. Budget constraint still holds,  c k f k − = ) (  . 
Note that selfτ   could only enforce his timeτ   consumption based on current 
capital stock  τ k . Under log utility assumption, individual’s timeτ   consumption can 
be expressed as, 
)] ( ~ ) ( [ ) ( τ τ ρ τ
τ
τ w k k c + ⋅ = . 
As a whole, individual’s lifetime strategy is time-consistent
2, which is characterized 
by, 
                        )] ( ~ ) ( [ ) ( t w t k k c t t + ⋅ = ρ .                       (2) 
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2.1.2 Sophisticates’ choice 
Sophisticates’ problem is intrinsically time-consistent, while is characterized by 
another dynamic system slightly different from naifs’. 
)] ( ) ( [ / t t
cc
c
t t k k f
c u
u
c c ρ − ′ − =  , 
                       c k f k − = ) (  .                                (4) 
                                                   
2  Note that the instantaneous discount factor  ρ does not depend on the locus of time directly. 
3  See Appendix Proposition A1 for detailed proof.   7 
With log instantaneous utility, individual’s current consumption would be a fraction of 
his lifetime wealth, although the coefficient is changing with capital flow
4. 
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We can easily verify that  ) ( ) ( / t t t t k k f c c ρ − ′ =    is associated with the above 
consumption  function.                                               (5)   
 
2.2 Basic model with hyperbolic discounting 
The representative’s preference is characterized by endogenously determined 
factor ) ( t k ρ   along with intrinsically decreasing marginal impatience, represented by 
an exogenous factor  ) ( τ φ − t , with  , 0 ) ( , 0 ) ( ≤ ⋅ ′ ′ ≥ ⋅ ′ φ φ   and  0 ) ( → ′ v φ   as  ∞ → v , as 
in Barro [1999]. From this assumption, we cannot tell whether an individual’s 
marginal impatience is increasing or decreasing, since there are two opposite 
directions that jointly determine the preference structure. We will never tell which one 
dominates until we make further assumptions. Here the two kind of individual 
preferences will take the forms of (N2) and (S2). 
 
(N2)Individual’s problem --- naifs, 
max ∫
∞ − + − −
τ
τ φ τ ρ τ dt e c u
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(S2)Individual’s problem --- sophisticates, 
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t
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2.2.1 Naifs’ choice 
                                                   
4  See appendix for detailed proof.   8 
  We divide naifs’ choice into two categories: partially naïve and totally naïve whose 
implications are given as follows. 
Case 1--- partially naïve: 
If people are partly naïve only in the sense of the captital-related discount factor, 
whereas know the future self-control problems caused by time-inconsistent preference, 
in this case, he acts in the manner described by Barro(1999). But the crucial 
difference here is that current self’s strategy of lifetime choice is time-inconsistent 
because of his wrong prediction of the long run discount rate, although 
time-consistent in the sense of Barro given a constant long run discount rate. Again 
selfτ   could only commit his timeτ   consumption. 
In Barro [1999], given the log utility function, consumption will be a constant 
fraction of wealth,   
]  wages of   lue present va ) ( [ ) ( + ⋅ = t k t c λ , 
Ω = / 1 λ , where  ∫
∞ + − = Ω
0
)] ( [ dv e
v v φ ρ  
Here in our case,  ρ   is replaced by  ) ( τ ρ k for selfτ . That is,   
∫
∞ + − =
0
)] ( ) ( [ / 1 ) ( dv e k
v v k φ ρ
τ
τ λ  
Since selfτ could only enforce  τ c , individual’s lifetime choice is characterized by a 
time-consistent strategy, 
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Remark: 1) Here under the assumption of partially naïve, we see that although current 
self’s perceived “optimal” plan is intrinsically time-inconsistent in the eyes of future 
selfs, the individual’s behavior as a whole exhibit time-consistent dynamics. The logic 
behind such findings is that the endogenous discount factor does not depend on the 
realization of a specific time, but only on the current capital level.   9 
       2) Our methodology
5  is clear: First find out what each self will choose under 
his own belief; then combine all selfs’ strategy to obtain individual’s lifetime choice. 
Since naifs have no demand for commitment technology, each self could only enforce 
his current choice of consumption, which is his only contribution to the lifetime 
choice of the individual. 
 
Case 2--- totally naïve: 
If people are totally naïve both in the captital-related discount factor and the 
future self-control problems caused by time-inconsistent preference, here selfτ ’s 
choice is of the neo-classical kind --- first-order optimality conditions from the current 
value Hamiltonian. 
The first order conditions are given by, 
t c u λ = , 
)] ( ) ( ) ( [ / τ φ ρ λ λ τ − ′ − − ′ − = t k k f t t t  , 
where  t λ   is the co-state variable associated with  t k . 
And thus in selfτ ’s eyes,  )] ( ) ( ) ( [ / τ φ ρ τ
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Budget constraint still holds,  c k f k − = ) (  . 
Note that selfτ   could only enforce  τ c   based on current capital stock  τ k . Under log 
utility, selfτ ’s consumption is given by
6, 
)] ( ~ ) ( [ ) ( τ τ η τ
τ
τ w k k c + ⋅ = , where 
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5  The method that we use to calculate individual’s lifetime behavior will repeat throughout the remaining part of 
this paper. 
6  See Appendix Proposition A3 for details.   10 
                   c k f k − = ) (  .                            (7) 
Remark: 1) We do not consider here the third case where individual is naïve only with 
respect to the factor  ) (⋅ φ , in which his will derive his first-order optimality conditions 
from the current value Hamiltonian. 
       2) It is easily seen that, in case 1 and case 2, the effective rate of time 
preference coincide ---  ) ( ) ( τ τ η λ k k ≡ . We may conclude that whether people are 
naïve about their intrinsically decreasing marginal impatience, characterized by the 
item  ) ( τ φ − t , does not matter for his behavior under log utility. From the reasoning 
above, we also see that it does not matter to distinguish naifs or sophisticates in Barro 




2.2.2 Sophisticates’ choice with no commitment 
Suppose people are well-informed about there capital-adjusting preference, as 
well as his future self-control problem. Following Barro(1999), and using the results 
under 2.1.2, we derive the optimal strategy of individuals. 
In 2.1.2, with log utility function, we have, 
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Proposition 1. Under log instantaneous utility function, sophisticates’ consumption 
function would be of the form, 
)] ( ~ ) ( [ ) ( ) ( t w t k K t c t + ⋅ = µ ,  ∫
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Remark: Barro’s [1999] consumption function is a special case of Proposition 1 with 
                                                   
7  For general utility function, Barro [1999] only considers the case of sophisticates. Also see Rabin, et al [1999] 
for examples concerning the different behavior between naifs and sophisticates under various assumptions of costs 
and rewards.   11 
ρ ρ ≡ ) (k . 
 
3. Characterization of the Steady State 
Define a steady-state equilibrium as  0 = c    and  0 = k  .   
3.1 Naifs (in Sec 2.1.1 ) 
Note that  t t t k k k   ) ( ) ( ρ ρ ′ = , so in steady state we also have  0 = ρ  . The long run 
discount rate is given by  ) (k ρ ρ = , in which  k   is the steady state level of capital 
stock. Hence, the steady state is characterized by the following set of conditions: 
0 ) ( ) ( = − ′ k k f ρ , 
                               0 ) ( = −c k f .                        (8) 
Remark: In the case of naifs, (8) holds only for log utility. 
 
3.2 Sophisticates (in Sec 2.1.2) 
The steady state is characterized by (8) for general utility function. 
 
3.3 Partially or totally naïve person (in Sec 2.2.1) 
Note that  t t t k k k   ) ( ) ( λ λ ′ = , so we will have 0 = λ    in steady state. The long run 
effective rate of time preference is given by:  ∫
∞ + − = =
0
)] ( ) ( [ / 1 ) ( dv e k
v v k φ ρ λ λ . The 
steady state is characterized by: 
0 ) ( ) ( = − ′ k k f λ  
                              0 ) ( = −c k f .                       (9) 
Compared to other hyperbolic discounting models, the long run discount rate in this 
model will interact with steady state capital stock, both of which are jointly 
determined by the dynamic system (9). Thus the extent to which people raise their 
marginal impatience will have great effect on the final steady state level of capital 
stock. To illustrate our logic, we assume  ) (k ρ   takes the form of  bk k = ) ( ρ , where b   12 
is a positive constant representing the marginal increase of impatience due to one unit 
increase of capital stock. In steady state we have, 
                     ∫
∞ + ⋅ ⋅ − = ′
0
)] ( [ / 1 ) ( dv e k f
v v k b φ ,                     (10) 
which implicitly determines steady state level of capital stock as a function of b, i.e., 
) (b k k = . Consider the case that  b  rises from  0 b   to  1 b . Initially, the right side of 
equation (10) will increase, and the capital will move downward to the new steady 
state, which is driven by the decreasing marginal productivity. At the same time, the 
right side of (10) will decrease gradually as capital stock moves downward until the 
two sides of (10) rebalance
8. 
Further, we could express steady state level of consumption as  )) ( ( ) ( b k f b c = . 
Differentiating both sides with respect to b, we easily see that, 
0 / ) ( )) ( ( / ) ( < ⋅ ′ = db b k d b k f db b c d .   
Remark: 1) The greater the extent of increasing marginal impatience, the lower the 
steady state level of consumption and capital stock,  ) , ( k c . Intuitively, as people get 
more impatient during the process of capital accumulation, the saving rate will 
decrease accordingly and they tend to distribute less of the income to investment, and 
thus lower the long run consumption. 
2) Compare the steady state between convention Ramsey model and the 
hyperbolic discounting model. 
In conventional settings,  β = ′ ) (
* k f , where β   denotes the constant 
discount rate. 
While in the hyperbolic discounting settings, e.g. Barro [1999], we have, 
λ = ′ ) (k f , where  ∫
∞ + − =
0
)] ( [ / 1 dv e
v v φ ρ λ , and  ) 0 ( φ ρ λ ρ ′ + ≤ ≤ . From the concavity 
of product function, we have the following inequality, 
                     ) ( )) 0 ( (
* * ρ φ ρ k k k ≤ ≤ ′ +                      (11) 
                                                   
8  See Proposition A4 in appendix for rigorous mathematical proof.   13 
Based on (11), we see that if β   lies to the left of ρ , we will have k k ≥
* , i.e., 
hyperbolic settings lower the steady state level of capital stock, and ifβ   lies to the 
right of ) 0 ( φ ρ ′ + , we will have  k k ≤
* , i.e., hyperbolic settings generate a higher 
level of long run capital.  To compare the steady state level of capital between 
conventional settings and hyperbolic settings is equivalent to compare the effective 
rate of time preference, which is β for the former and ρ   for the latter. Note that this 
comparison is exogenously determined by representative’s preference structure, while 
in our endogenous preference setting, the extent of increasing marginal impatience 
due to capital accumulation itself will have a negative effect on steady state locus 
) , ( k c . And thus apart from the issues that a strong capitalist spirit can lead to 
unbounded growth of consumption and capital
9, we find that a high extent to which 
capital affects individuals’ marginal impatience will damage this engine, which 
theoretically supports the logic of Weber. 
3) Compare the steady state between models in 2.1 and that of 2.2, and we 
may examine what the introducing of hyperbolic preference will imply for long run 
capital stock and consumption level. 
For the former case, we have, () () TC fk k ρ ′ = ; and for the latter, we have, 
[ ( ) ( )]




N f k e dv kk k
φ ρ ρ λ ρφ
∞ −+ ′ ≤ =≤+ ′ = ∫ , where k   and k   are the 
respective steady state level of capital, and TC represents the case under 
time-consistent preference while N represents the case of naifs. Our objective is to 
compare  k   andk , which are already implicitly determined, and thus could be seen 
as given constants. Further, we assume that   
( ( ) ( ) (0), [0 ) ,) N C N T x xx x ρ ρ ρφ ′ ≤ ≤ + ∈∞ . 
                                                   
9  With a capitalist-spirit model by including wealth in utility function, Zou [1994] finds that a strong capitalist 
spirit can lead to unbounded growth of consumption and capital even though the net marginal product of capital is 
less than the time discount rate or goes to zero when capital stock increases to infinity. For further discussions, see 
also Zou [1995] and [1998].   14 
We first examine two polar cases. 
3.1.  () () N TC x x ρ ρ = . We easily see that  () () fk fk ≤ ′′ , and thus  kk ≥ . 
Here hyperbolic naïve representatives produce lower level of steady state capital than 
that of non-hyperbolic individuals. 
3.2.  ( ) (0) () C N T x x ρ ρφ ′ = + . In this case, we havekk ≤ .   
For the intermediate case, where  () () () ( 0 ) N T N C x xx ρρ ρ φ′ < <+ , the 
relationship between  k   andk   is undetermined. In essence, we need to compare the 
two functionals, 
() TC k ρ   and 
[ ( ) ( )]
0 1/ ()
N kv v e dv k
φ ρ λ
∞ −+ ≡ ∫   --- the effective rate of time preference. 
 
4) For other cases concerning naifs as in section 2.1.1 or sophisticates in 
section 2.1.2, the same results will obtain. 
 
3.4 Stability of the Steady State 
Proposition 3.1: Given the time preference is endogenously determined by capital 
stock, and given that individual is sophisticate, i.e. the setup in section 2.1.2 without 
the assumption of hyperbolic discounting, we will obtain a saddle point equilibrium 
around the steady state. 
Proof: Linearize (4) --- under log utility --- around the steady state  (,) ck   using (8) 
to obtain: 
              
0 [ () () ]
1 ()
c cc cfk k
k kk fk
ρ − ′′ ′  ⋅−   
=⋅     − ′ −    

                   (12) 
Suppose 1 λ   and  2 λ   to be the characteristic roots of the coefficient matrix in (12), and 
then we have the following equations: 
12 () 0 fk λλ ′ += >  
                        12 [ () () ] 0 cfk k λλ ρ ′′ ′ ⋅= ⋅ − <  ,              (13)   15 
which shows the existence of real solutions  1 λ   and  2 λ
10, and that  1 λ   and  2 λ   have 
opposite sign. The system defined by  (,) ck     is steady state stable at a saddle point.             
Q.E.D.                                  
 
Proposition 3.2: Given the time preference is endogenously determined by capital 
stock, and given that individual is naive, i.e. the setup in section 2.1.1 without the 
assumption of hyperbolic discounting, we will obtain a saddle point equilibrium 
around the steady state. 
Proof: Linearize (3) --- under log utility --- around the steady state  (,) ck   using (8) 
to obtain: 
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Suppose 1 λ   and  2 λ   to be the characteristic roots of the coefficient matrix in (12), and 














− ′ += , whose sign is undetermined, and 
12 () () 0 c f kc k λλ ρ ′′ ⋅= + ′ < − ,                                        (15) 
which shows that  1 λ   and  2 λ   have opposite sign. The system defined by  (,) ck     is 
still  steady  state  stable  at  a  saddle  point.                               Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3.3: Given the time preference is endogenously determined by capital 
stock, and given that individual is naive, i.e. the setup in section 2.2  with the 
assumption of hyperbolic discounting, we will obtain a saddle point equilibrium 
around the steady state. 
Proof: We turn to the case with present-biased preference structure in section 2.2. 
                                                   
10  Note that the characteristic polynomial of A  is 
2 [ ( )] E A trace A A µµ µ − = − ⋅+ .   16 






−   
= ⋅    −   

 ,                        (16) 
in which the coefficient matrix is given as in Appendix proposition A5. 
Let  1 µ   and  2 µ   be the two characteristics of matrix  (,) Ack , we have, 
[ ( ) ( )]
12 0 ( ){1 () }
kv v ck e k vdv
ρφ µµλ ρ
∞ −+ ′ + = −⋅ ⋅ ∫  
                12 { () () } 0 cf k k µµ λ ′′ ′ ⋅= − < ,                          (17) 
which shows that the system defined by  (,) ck     is steady state stable at a saddle point.  
Q.E.D. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
By reexamining the capital accumulation within a neo-classical growth model under 
the assumption of hyperbolic discounting as well as endogenous preference, we draw 
the main conclusions that 1) two kinds of Naifs’ behavior coincides under log utility; 
2) increasing marginal impatience due to capital accumulation itself will negatively 
affect the steady state locus of consumption and capital; 3) the effect of hyperbolic 
settings through effective rate of preference is still ambiguous; 4) we prove the 
saddle-point  equilibrium  property for the steady state under various assumptions 
about individual’s preference.  Another implications is that  although spirit of 
capitalism is an engine to capital accumulation, the subsequent growing wealth will 
damage this engine in the sense of Max Weber. 
 
Our next step would be examining the government policies along with their welfare 
implications under the framework provided in this paper. One way to extend our 
model is to making further assumptions on the capital-related preference, which will 
enrich the dynamics to a great extent.
12 
                                                   
11  See Appendix Proposition A5 for detailed proof. 
12  See P. Wang [2003] for detailed examples.   17 
Appendix 
 
First, we note that if consumption could be expressed as a fraction of lifetime wealth, 
a good proposition will obtain. 
 
Proposition A1. If consumption is a fraction of wealth,  )] ( ~ ) ( [ ) ( t w t k t c t + ⋅ = λ , and 
the fraction t λ   is time-dependent, the dynamics of consumption flow will be, 
t
t





 + − = / . 
Proof: If we define lifetime wealth  ) ( ~ ) ( t w t k Wt + ≡ , where  ) ( ~ t w   is present value of 
wages defined by,  ∫
∞ − − =
t
t v t v R dv e v w t w
) )( , ( ) ( ) ( ~ ,  ∫ −
≡
v
b ds s r
t v
t v R ) (
1
) , ( , and then the 
dynamics of wealth is given by, 
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t W r w k w r k r w r w c w k r t w t k W ) ( ] ~ [ ~ ] ~ [ ) ( ) ( ~ ) ( λ λ − = + ⋅ − + = + − + − + = + =    , 
where the second equality follows from the budget constraint, and the third equality 
follows from our special assumption of  t c . 
Differentiate the two sides of consumption-wealth relationship with respect to 
time, and we have, 
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t c c r W W r W W c λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ / ) ( ) (      ⋅ + − = ⋅ + − = ⋅ + ⋅ = . 
Rearrange, and we obtain the dynamics of consumption, 
t
t





 + − = / . 
Remark A1: In Barro’s [1999] paper, he conjectures the fraction to be a constant, 
which could be seen as a special case of the above proposition with  0 ≡ t λ  , and thus 
the growth rate of consumption is  λ − = t t t r c c /  .                      Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition A2. In the basic time-consistent model of sophisticates in section 2.1, the 
optimal consumption will be a fraction of lifetime wealth under the log instantaneous   18 
utility, which is given by  )] ( ~ ) ( [ ) ( ) ( t w t k K t c t + ⋅ = λ , where  ) ( ~ t w   is present value of 








/ 1 ) (
ρ
λ , and the set } ), ( { t s s k Kt ≥ = . 
Proof: We obtain our result from the budget constraint, t t t t t c w k r k − + =  , and the Euler 
equation, 
) ( / t t t t k r c c ρ − =  . Rearrange the budget constraint, 
] [ / ] [
) )( , ( ) )( , (
v v
t v t v R
v
t v t v R c w e dv k e d − =
− − − − , and then integrate two sides on the inteval 
) , [ ∞ t . 
We will have  ∫ ∫
∞ − − ∞ − − − = − = −
t v
t v t v R
t t v v
t v t v R
t dv c e w dv c w e k
) )( , ( ) )( , ( ~ ) ( ,        (A2.1) 
in which we have assumed the Non-Ponzi-Game condition  0 lim
) )( , ( =
− −
∞ → v
t v t v R
v k e . 




s ds k t v t v R
t v e c c
) ( ) )( , ( ρ
.                 (A2.2) 
Combine (A2.1) and (A2.2), and we will have, 
)] ( ~ ) ( [ ] / 1 [ ) (
) (





s + ⋅ ∫ = ∫
∞ − ρ
.             Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition A3. In the time-inconsistent model of totally naïve person in section 
2.2.1, the optimal consumption will be a fraction of lifetime wealth under the log 
instantaneous utility, which is given by  )] ( ~ ) ( [ ) ( τ τ η τ
τ
τ w k k c + ⋅ = , where 
∫
∞ + − =
0
)] ( ) ( [ / 1 ) ( dv e k
v v k φ ρ
τ
τ η  
Proof: By the same method as in proposition A2, we will obtain our result from the 
budget constraint,
τ
t c w k r k t t t t − + =  along with the Euler equation perceived by 
selfτ
13, 
) ( ) ( ) ( / τ φ ρ τ
τ τ − ′ − − ′ = t k k f c c t t t  . Rearrange the budget constraint, 
] [ / ] [
) )( , ( ) )( , ( τ τ τ τ τ
t c w e dt k e d t
t t R
t
t t R − =
− − − − , and then integrate both sides on the interval 
                                                   
13  Note that for naifs, future consumption is perceived as 
τ
t c by selfτ ; thus selfτ perceives the budget constraint 
as 
τ
t t t t t c w k r k − + =  , although the individual will act along  t t t t t c w k r k − + =    for every  t c   realized.   19 
) , [ ∞ τ . 
We will have  ∫ ∫









v v R ) )( , ( ) )( , ( ~ ) ( ,      (A3.1) 
in which we have assumed the Non-Ponzi-Game condition  0 lim





τ τ . 
From the Euler equation, we have 
) ( ) )( ( ) )( , ( τ φ τ ρ τ τ τ τ τ
τ
− − − − − =
v v k v v R e c c
v .         (A3.2) 
Combine (A3.1) and (A3.2), and we will have, 
)] ( ~ ) ( [ ] / 1 [
)] ( ) )( ( [ τ τ
τ
τ φ τ ρ τ τ
τ w k dt e c
t t k + ⋅ = ∫
∞ − + − − . 
That is, 
)] ( ~ ) ( [ ] / 1 [
0
)] ( ) ( [ τ τ
φ ρ τ τ
τ w k dv e c
v v k + ⋅ = ∫
∞ + −
            
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition A4. Given that ) (k ρ   takes the form of  bk k = ) ( ρ , where b is a positive 
constant representing the marginal increase of impatience due to one unit increase of 
capital stock. And the steady state level of capital is implicitly determined by, 
∫
∞ + ⋅ ⋅ − = ′
0
)] ( [ / 1 ) ( dv e k f
v v k b φ   (10). If we denote the steady state capital as  ) (b k k = , the 
capital stock is a decreasing function of b, i.e.  0 / ) ( < db b k d . 





)] ( [ ] /[ ) / ) ( ( / ) ( ) ( ∫ ∫
∞ + ⋅ ⋅ − ∞ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ ′ ′ dv e dv db b k d v b v k e db b k d k f
v v k b v v k b φ φ . 







)] ( [ ] /[ ) ( / ) ( ] ) ( ) ( [ ∫ ∫ ∫
∞ + ⋅ ⋅ − ∞ + ⋅ ⋅ − ∞ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ − ′ ′ dv e dv v k e db b k d dv v b e k f
v v k b v v k b v v k b φ φ φ . 
The right side of the above equation is positive, and the item in the bracket in the left 
side is negative, so we conclude that  0 / ) ( < db b k d .                    Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition A5.  Given 
[ ( ) ( )]
0 ( ) 1/
kv v k e dv
ρφ λ
∞ −+ = ∫   and  () k fk c = −  , the dynamic 





−   
= ⋅    −   











.   20 
The elements in the coefficient matrix are given by, 
[ ( ) ( )]
11 0 () ()
kv v a k c k e vdv
ρφ λρ
∞ −+ ′ = − ⋅⋅ ⋅∫ , 
[ ( ) ( )]
12 0 { () () () () () }
kv v a c f k k k k f k e vdv
ρφ λ λρ
∞ −+ ′′ ′ ′ ′ = − +⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∫ , 
21 1 a = − , 
22 ) () ( a fk k λ ′ = = .                                               (A5.1) 
Proof: First, we easily see that, 
2 [ ( ) ( )]
0 () / () 0
kv v d k dk k e vdv
ρφ λ λρ
∞ −+ ′ = ⋅⋅ > ∫ , and then 
we have, 
2 [ ( ) ( )]
0 [ () / ] ()[() ]
kv v d k dk k k f k c e vdv
ρφ λ λ λρ
∞ −+ ′ = ⋅= ⋅ ⋅ −⋅ ∫
  . Then (6) 
becomes, 
[ ( ) ( )]
0 / () () () ()[() ]
()
kv v c c f k k k k f k c e vdv
k fk c
ρφ λ λρ
∞ −+ ′′ = − + ⋅ ⋅ −⋅
= −
∫ 
              (A5.2) 
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